Monopsony as an Agency and Regulatory Problem in Health Care by Hammer, Peter J. & Sage, William M.
Wayne State University
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School
1-1-2004
Monopsony as an Agency and Regulatory Problem
in Health Care
Peter J. Hammer
Wayne State University, peter.hammer@wayne.edu
William M. Sage
Columbia University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Peter J. Hammer & William M. Sage, Monopsony as an Agency and Regulatory Problem in Health Care, 71 Antitrust L. J. 949 (2004).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/14
MONOPSONY AS AN AGENCY AND REGULATORY
PROBLEM IN HEALTH CARE
PETER J. HAMMER
WILLIAM M. SAGE*
Antitrust courts have shortchanged the economic analysis of buyer-
side market power in health care. This failure derives to a surprising
degree from a single judicial decision, then-Judge Stephen Breyer's 1984
opinion for the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Kartell v. Blue Shield of
Massachusetts.' Breyer's opinion, while sound when read in context, has
been understood by subsequent courts to excuse health insurers' imposi-
tion of price and nonprice terms on contracting providers on the grounds
that insurers merely are acting as aggressive purchasing agents, thus
implying that their actions are welfare-enhancing for consumers. This
view of health insurers as proxies for end-users collapses a three-level
model of industrial production-comprised of provider-suppliers,
insurer-producers, and patient-consumers-into a single buyer-seller
dyad. It thereby sidesteps an inquiry into the competitive conditions of
resale that is central to the traditional antitrust analysis of producer
* Peter Hammer is a Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School. William
Sage is a Professor of Law at Columbia Law School. Earlier work by the authors on medical
antitrust law was supported by an Investigator Award in Health Policy Research from the
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
I When most people think of Kartell, they recall Justice Breyer's opinion when he sat
on the First Circuit. That decision, however, came at the end of a seven-year legal battle.
The district court originally dismissed the complaint in light of the state action doctrine.
Kartell v. Blue Shield, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,480 (D. Mass. 1978) (KartellI). That
decision was reversed by the First Circuit with instructions to abstain from exercising
federal jurisdiction until a parallel state court suit was resolved. Kartell v. Blue Shield, 592
F.2d 1191 (1st Cir. 1979) (Kartell II). The federal district court ultimately certified the
state statutory questions to the SupremeJudicial Court of Massachusetts for its determina-
tion. Kartell v. Blue Shield, 425 N.E. 2d 313 (Mass. 1981) (Kartellll). Based on the state
court's ruling, Blue Shield received summary judgment under the state action doctrine
on all alleged anticompetitive conduct with the one exception of its prohibition against
balance billing. Kartell v. Blue Shield, 542 F. Supp. 782 (D. Mass. 1982) (Kartell V). The
First Circuit declined to review the district court's refusal to permit plaintiffs to amend
their complaint after it permitted the Massachusetts Medical Society to intervene in the
law suit. Kartell v. Blue Shield, 687 F.2d 543 (lst Cir. 1982) (Katell V). After trial, the
district court held that Blue Shield's ban on balance billing violated Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Kartell v. Blue Shield, 582 F. Supp. 734 (D. Mass. 1984) (Kartell V). The
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monopsony. Simultaneously, it avoids questions that are specific to health
care regarding insurers as buying agents for consumers, such as the
relationship between risk-aggregation and individual treatment prefer-
ences and the arguably competing "clinical agent" role played by
physicians.
The Kartell court's failure to delve into agency issues is attributable to
the regulatory climate in which the challenged conduct occurred, which
constrained Blue Shield's ability to exploit supplier discounts for its own
advantage and walled off its rate-related conduct from important public
policy considerations of health care quality and access. Because regula-
tory conditions and industry practices have changed dramatically since
the Kartell decision was rendered, it is incumbent on antitrust courts to
pay closer attention to agency issues when evaluating buyer-side conduct
in health care. More generally, the Kartell experience teaches that regula-
tion has significant implications for antitrust analysis even, perhaps espe-
cially, when it falls short of constituting "state action."
In Kartell, the First Circuit held that Blue Shield of Massachusetts' ban
on balance billing by participating physicians did not violate the antitrust
laws notwithstanding the defendant's position as the state's largest health
insurer. 2judge Breyer assumed that Blue Shield's contractual restrictions
on physicians would reduce health care costs for Blue Shield subscribers.
In other words, rather than exploiting its market power, the nonprofit
Blue Shield would act as the individual consumer's faithful agent. These
assumptions, in addition to a tendency in the opinion to focus on the
cost (price) of medical care to the near exclusion of considerations of
quality and access, were defensible in the highly regulated environment
in which the challenged conduct took place. Health insurance at that
time was a fee-for-service, unmanaged enterprise, which made insurers
look much like purchasing agents when bargaining over fees with physi-
cians and not like health care providers in their own right. Other state
regulatory processes were in place to keep premium rates stable and to
protect quality of and access to health care. Consequently, antitrust
courts did not view quality and access as competitive concerns, andjudges
First Circuit reversed this finding in Breyer's celebrated opinion. Kartell v. Blue Shield,
749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984) (Kartell VII).
2 "Balance billing" in Medicare and private fee-for-service health insurance means "the
practice of billing patients in excess of the amount approved by the health plan. In
Medicare, a balance bill cannot exceed 15 percent of the allowed charge for nonparticipat-
ing physicians." PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMMISSION, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 482 (1997). Physicians who sign participation agreements with Medicare, thereby
"accepting assignment," get paid directly by the government rather than collecting Medi-
care amounts from patients and may not balance bill. Id. at 481-82.
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gave little thought to developing an integrated competition policy with
respect to these issues.
Breyer's assumptions can no longer be taken for granted. Health care
antitrust law requires a more sophisticated and comprehensive approach
to buyer-side conduct and the multiple agency relationships between
initial purchasers and end-users. The regulatory explanation for Kartell's
analysis also demonstrates an important general proposition: lack of
"state action" sufficient to immunize conduct from antitrust scrutiny
should not remove regulatory considerations from the competitive equa-
tion. To the contrary, as the Supreme Court's recent decision in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP acknowledges,
courts should display greater sensitivity to the de facto as well as dejure
impact of state regulation on antitrust analysis.3
The article is organized as follows. Part I returns to the source, explain-
ing the controversy in Kartell, examining Breyer's opinion, and summariz-
ing its impact on other courts. Part II looks at Kartell through the lens of
classic monopsony theory involving suppliers, producers, and consumers,
and focuses on the opinion's oversimplification of the relationship
between health insurers and insured individuals. It further considers
whether lower input prices result in lower consumer prices in the end-
product market, and, therefore, whether monopsony power can be
welfare-enhancing. Part III evaluates Kartell's disregard of other impor-
tant principal-agent problems in health care that arguably influence the
welfare analysis of insurer conduct. It explores the degree to which group
insurers stand in the shoes of individual consumers and the implications
of non-insurer agency relationships, such as between physicians and
patients. Part IV seeks to explain Kartell's blind spots in regulatory terms
and evaluates the implications of major changes in the structure and
regulation of health insurance since 1980. The article contends that the
reach and substantive content of antitrust law depend upon the regula-
tory environment in which alleged monopsony power is exercised, and
asserts an important role for antitrust courts in the future.
3 124 S. Ct. 872, 881 (2004) ("Antitrust analysis must always be attuned to the particular
structure and circumstances of the industry at issue. Part of that attention to economic
context is an awareness of the significance of regulation."); see also Town of Concord v.
Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that the existence of full price
regulation in the electricity industry made a "price squeeze" by a forward-integrated
monopolist less likely to have an exclusionary effect on competitors) (Breyer, C.J.).
2004]
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I. REVISITING KARTELL AND ITS PROGENY
A. HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE
Blue Shield of Massachusetts was created by state statute in 1941,
under sponsorship of the Massachusetts Medical Society.4 From 1941
to 1967, Blue Shield compensated physicians according to a fixed fee
schedule and permitted physicians to charge additional fees to certain
classes of higher-income patients (i.e., balance billing).5 In 1968 Blue
Shield implemented a charge-based system of reimbursement, in which
Blue Shield paid physicians their "usual and customary" fees and largely
prohibited the practice of balance billing.6 As with Medicare's fee-for-
service system, what followed was a period of rapidly escalating costs for
physician services (and escalating premiums for Blue Shield subscrib-
ers). 7 By 1975 Blue Shield was in a bind. While costs attributable to
physician fees were rising dramatically, the state Insurance Commissioner
placed substantial political pressure on Blue Shield, which also faced
competition from private carriers, not to increase subscriber premiums.
8
As reserves plummeted from $26 million in January 1975 to less than
$1 million in March 1976,9 Blue Shield's only viable option was to limit
physician fees. Through various ploys, the 1968 system of "usual and
customary" charges devolved once again into a fee schedule imposed by
Blue Shield (and implicitly approved by the Insurance Commission). 10
4 Sylvia Law and Barry Ensminger provide a detailed study of the history and background
of the dispute. See Sylvia A. Law & Barry Ensminger, Negotiating Physicians'Fees: Individual
Patient orSociety? (A Case Study in Federalism), 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1,24 (1986). Foran engaging
discussion of the economic issues underlying Kartel, see H.E. Frech, Monopoly in Health
Care Insurance: The Economics of Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, in HEALTH CARE
IN AMERICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH INSURANCE (H.E. Frech,
ed.) (1988).
5 Kartell III, 425 N.E. 2d at 317.
6 Id. at 317-18.
7 Law & Ensminger, supra note 4, at 26.
8 Id.
I Kartell III, 425 N.E. 2d at 318. In response to the 1975 financial difficulties, the Medical
Society and Blue Shield agreed to freeze physician rates for the following year. Law &
Ensminger, supra note 4, at 26. There was more pragmatism than altruism to the Medical
Society's decision. A provision of the original 1942 Participating Physician's Agreement
required physicians to consent to reduced pro rata compensation of their claims in the
event that Blue Shield had insufficient funds to pay claims in full. Kartell III, 425 N.E. 2d
at 322. In essence, physicians and Blue Shield shared risk under the agreement. The
sharing of risk was part of a political compromise permitting Blue Shield to incorporate
without establishing the same type of financial reserves that would have been required of
a commercial insurer. Id. at 321.
1o Kartell VI, 582 F. Supp. at 740-41. "Blue Shield imposed these limitations, at least in
part, because it believed that the Commissioner of Insurance would disapprove its rates
if Blue Shield did not aggressively limit physicians' fees." Law & Ensminger, supra note
4, at 27 (citing trial transcript of testimony of Blue Shield executive).
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From the perspective of limiting costs, these actions were successful.
By 1982, Blue Shield payments were 30 percent less than physicians'
standard charges."
Facing Blue Shield's efforts to limit fees, the Medical Society fought
back, fronting physician-plaintiffs in separate state and federal lawsuits.
The state suit, Nelson v. Blue Shield, 12 challenged Blue Shield's prohibition
against balance billing and other practices as illegally coercive under
state contract and insurance law. The state suit was ultimately dismissed
because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies.'
The federal suit, Kartell v. Blue Shield, alleged violations of Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.14 Specifically, the suit challenged the following
practices: (1) Blue Shield's prohibition against balance billing, (2) Blue
Shield's refusal to compensate non-participating physicians except for
emergency services, and (3) Blue Cross's refusal, by agreement with Blue
Shield, to make payments to physicians for medical services except under
limited circumstances. 5 Blue Shield's principal defense was that the
challenged practices were mandated by state law and therefore exempt
from antitrust liability under the state action doctrine.
The Kartell dispute generated three published federal district court
opinions, three federal appellate court opinions, and one Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court opinion. The district court originally dismissed
the complaint, finding all of Blue Shield's conduct immunized under
the state action doctrine. 6 The First Circuit reversed, holding that in
1i Kartell VI, 582 F. Supp. at 741.
12 387 N.E. 2d 589 (Mass. 1979).
13 Id. at 592-93.
14 That the litigation was paid for by the Medical Society, and that the lawyers had before
them the entire roster of physician members from which to select named plaintiffs, suggest
that antitrust lawyers do, after all, have a sense of humor. Unfortunately, Dr. Kartell's own
fate was tragic. In 2000, he was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in the hospital room
shooting of his estranged wife's lover and sentenced to 5-8 years in prison. SeeJordana
Hart, DoctorIs Guilty in Death of His Rival, BOSTON GLOBE,June 24, 2000, at BI. His medical
license was revoked later that year.
11 Kartell VI, 582 F. Supp. at 736. Blue Cross organizations are the oldest health insurers
in the United States and trace their origins to state hospital associations' needs during
the Depression to assure revenue to their members. As non-profit "service benefit plans,"
they provided hospital services directly to insured individuals-not merely a financial
indemnity for covered expenses incurred-and paid participating hospitals a negotiated
fee. Blue Shield organizations were established shortly thereafter by state medical societies
to cover physician services on a similar, but not identical, basis. See PAUL STARR, THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 295-310 (1982). In recent decades,
many Blue Cross and Blue Shield organizations have merged, become for-profit corpora-
tions, and otherwise blurred the distinctions between them and commercial health insurers.
See Robert Cunningham & Douglas B. Sherlock, Bounceback: Blues Thrive as Markets Cool
Toward HMOs, HEALTH AiR., Jan-Feb. 2002, at 24-38.
16 Kartell I, 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,480 (D. Mass. 1978).
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light of the related state court action, Nelson v. Blue Shield, the federal
court should abstain until Massachusetts was afforded the opportunity
to interpret Blue Shield's enabling statute for itself.17 The complaint
in Nelson v. Blue Shield, however, was dismissed without addressing the
substantive statutory questions.'8 In response, the federal district court
certified the state law issues to the Massachusetts SupremeJudicial Court.
The state high court ruled that Blue Shield's prohibition against balance
billing was not mandated by state law, but that both its refusal to compen-
sate non-participating physicians for non-emergency services and the
general prohibition against Blue Shield and Blue Cross competing to
insure physician services were required by statute.1 9
Based on these rulings, the federal district court held that Blue Shield's
state-mandated conduct was immunized under the state action doctrine.
20
Because the prohibition against balance billing was not state-mandated,
the court ruled that the antitrust suit challenging that practice could
proceed. However, the court also held that the legality of the prohibition
would be judged under the rule of reason, not the per se standard
usually applied to price fixing.21 After a lengthy bench trial, the district
court determined that Blue Shield's prohibition of balance billing was
an unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore a violation of Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act.22 It is this decision that was reviewed in
Breyer's First Circuit opinion. Although the Medical Society attempted
through additional litigation to resurrect the broader claims,23 the anti-
trust claim considered by the court ultimately focused on the isolated
issue of balance billing.
17 Kartell I, 592 F.2d 1191 (1st Cir. 1979).
18 Nelson v. Blue Shield, 387 N.E. 2d 589 (1979).
19 KartellII, 425 N.E. 2d 313 (Mass. 1981).
20 Kartell IV, 542 F. Supp. 782, 788-92 (D. Mass. 1982).
21 Id. at 796.
22 Kartell VI, 582 F. Supp. 734, 745-55 (D. Mass. 1984). The court held, however, that
the same practice did not violate Section 2. Id. at 755.
23 The Medical Society felt that it had lost control of the litigation midstream. It sought
to change legal teams and amend the complaint to broaden its scope. Dr. Kartell and the
original team of lawyers resisted. As a result, the Medical Society sought to intervene in
the lawsuit as a party. The Medical Society also filed a second lawsuit with a new set of
fronted physician plaintiffs pleading the substance of its desired amended complaint. The
district court granted the Society's motion to intervene, but denied its motion to amend
the complaint. The district court also dismissed the second lawsuit. The Medical Society
sought interlocutory review from the First Circuit. The appellate court ruled that it lacked
jurisdiction in the absence of a final order or judgment. Kartell V 687 F. 2d. 543 (1st
Cir. 1982).
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B. JUDGE BREYER'S OPINION
In eleven sharply written pages, Breyer disposed of a complicated
antitrust dispute that had lasted over seven years. 24 Breyer found a way
of resolving the dispute largely without reference to or reliance upon
the evidence actually submitted to the district court.25 Instead, he focused
on the centrality of the insurer-insured agency relationship, thereby
framing the dispute in a manner where he could conclude that Blue
Shield's conduct did not create antitrust liability, even assuming that
Blue Shield possessed and exercised significant market power. Breyer's
description of the market acknowledges that Blue Shield combines physi-
cian services and insurance into a product that it sells to consumers in
exchange for a premium. 26 Given the prohibition against balance billing,
he notes, "Blue Shield pays [the contract] amount directly to the doctor;
the patient pays nothing out of pocket and therefore receives no reim-
bursement." 27 By assuming that Blue Shield acts merely as a faithful
purchasing agent, Breyer is able to collapse the three-stage physician-
insurer-consumer relationship into a single transaction between insurers








We disagree with the district court's finding of "restraint." To find an
unlawful restraint, one would have to look at Blue Shield as if it were
a "third force," intervening in the marketplace in a manner that prevents
willing buyers and sellers from independently coming together to strike
price/quality bargains. Antitrust law typically frowns upon behavior that
impedes the striking of such independent bargains. The persuasive
24 Kartell VII, 749 F.2d 922.
21 The district court noted that the parties submitted so many exhibits, many of which
ran "hundreds of pages" and contained "thousands of numbers" that the court had "the
near-impossible task of deciding the credibility of two competing, undigestible piles of
paper." Kartell VI, 582 F. Supp. at 737.
26 Kartell WI, 749 F.2d at 923 ("Blue Shield provides health insurance for physician
services. ... The consumers of Blue Shield's insurance ... can see any 'participating





power of the district court's analysis disappears, however, once one
looks at Blue Shield, not as an inhibitory "third force," but as itself the
purchaser of the doctors' services.2"
The agency theme pervades the opinion. Breyer notes:
Several circuits have held in antitrust cases that insurer activity closely
analogous to that present here amounts to purchasing, albeit for the
account of others. And, they have held that an insurer may lawfully
engage in such buying of goods and services needed to make the
insured whole.n
From this basis, he reasons that "from a commercial perspective, Blue
Shield in essence 'buys' medical services for the account of others,"30
although he is sensitive to that fact that he is arguing by analogy.
The relevant antitrust facts are that Blue Shield pays the bill and seeks
to set the amount of the charge. Those facts led other courts in similar
circumstances to treat insurers as if they were "buyers." The same facts
convince us that Blue Shield's activities here are like those of a buyer."1
This analogy drives the subsequent antitrust analysis. " [T] here is no law
forbidding a legitimate insurance company from itself buying the goods
or services needed to make its customer whole.132 "Here, Blue Shield
and the doctors 'sit on opposite sides of the bargaining table.' And Blue
Shield seems simply to be acting 'as every rational enterprise does, i.e.,
[to] get the best deal possible.' 3 3 "These [ ] considerations convince us
to apply mainstream antitrust doctrine, which allows a buyer or seller
freedom to bargain for price, rather than to seek analogies with more
unusual cases that do not."34
If Blue Shield is just a "buyer" facing willing physician-sellers, then,
according to the court, it should enjoy the deference antitrust law ordi-
narily extends to buyers. The opinion continues: "Antitrust law rarely
stops the buyer of a service from trying to determine the price or charac-
teristics of the product that will be sold."3 5 Phrased differently, if the
insurer-insured agency relationship legitimately turns the insurer into
the consumer, then the insurer's conduct is not illegal. Breyer writes:
28 Id. at 924.
29 Id. at 925.
3 Id.
1 Id. at 926.
32 Id. at 928.
33 Id. at 929-30 (citations omitted).
34 Id. at 930.
15 Id. at 925.
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"Thus, the more closely Blue Shield's activities resemble, in essence,
those of a purchaser, the less likely that they are unlawful. 36
Next, Breyer cites with approval numerous cases where courts have
held that insurers purchasing on behalf of their insureds do not violate
antitrust law.37 Plaintiffs sought to distinguish these cases on the grounds
that those insurers, unlike Blue Shield of Massachusetts, did not have
market power.38 Indeed, excluding public sources of insurance such as
Medicare and Medicaid, Blue Shield (combined with Blue Cross for
hospital services) covered 74 percent of the private health insurance
market.3 9 Around 99 percent of all physicians had signed Participating
Agreements with Blue Shield. 4° Payments under these agreements
accounted for 13 to 14 percent of physician practice revenue.41
Rather than defining a market (product and geographic) and assessing
barriers to entry, Breyer simply assumed that Blue Shield possesses "sig-
nificant market power" and that "Blue Shield uses that power to obtain
'lower than competitive' prices. ' 42 Nonetheless, Breyer rejected the claim
that Blue Shield's market power provided a basis for distinguishing the
defendant's insurance line of cases. He also rejected the claim that Blue
Shield's market power was as an independent basis for liability under
Section 2. To establish a Section 2 violation,just as in the case of monop-
oly, a plaintiff must show not only monopsony power but monopsony
conduct. Monopsony conduct is action that is either predatory or
36ld.
37 Id.
8 Although the case is explicitly about buyer-side distortion of competition, the word
"monopsony" appears nowhere in Breyer's opinion. Plaintiffs did argue that the prohibition
against balance billing violated Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Section
2 claim alleged a monopoly both in the market for selling insurance and in the market
for purchasing physician services. The latter is a monopsony problem. Kartell VI, 582 F.
Supp. at 736. However, the district court held that Blue Shield's ban on balance billing
was a unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1, but not a violation of
Section 2.
19 Another 23% represented commercial indemnity insurance. Consistent with the year
and geographic location, only 4% of the market belonged to health maintenance organiza-
tions (HMOs). Kartell VII, 749 F. 2d at 924.
40 Id. at 926.
41 Id. at 924.
42 Id. at 927. Establishing the existence of insurer market power in health care markets
is usually not this easy. Most courts have concluded that defendant health insurers lack
market power. In terms of product market, they reason that all health insurance options
are close substitutes. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406
(7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting argument for a separate HMO market). In terms of geographic
market, they reason that health care financing is regional if not national in scope. See,
e.g., Ball Mem'l Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1330-33 (7th Cir. 1986).
Furthermore, courts typically assume that barriers to entry in health care financing are
relatively low. Id. at 1335.
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exclusionary. To Breyer, while physician fees without balance billing
might be below the competitive level, they were not predatory in the
sense of falling below the incremental cost of providing the services.
43
Breyer did not expressly consider whether the prohibition against bal-
ance billing was exclusionary; i.e., would the practice deter the entry of
competing insurance companies into the market?44 The most convention-
ally defensible answer to the question of exclusionary conduct would
be "no. ' 45 In most settings, Blue Shield's conduct (paying lower than
competitive rates of physician compensation) would make it easier for
a new insurance carrier to enroll a provider panel of disgruntled Blue
Shield physicians and enter the market. 46
Breyer then focused on the effects of Blue Shield's market power on
"price." Here, Breyer's discussion becomes confused. First, he fails to
distinguish input prices (physician fees) from output prices (subscriber
premiums). Second, it is not always clear when Breyer's references to
price are meant to be interpreted as part of a general doctrinal discussion
or when they are meant to be understood in light of the actual trial
43 Kartell VII, 749 F. 2d at 928. Theoretically defining and empirically establishing the
appropriate "cost" benchmark for purposes of predation is difficult. See generally Phillip
Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975). The problem is even more complicated in the
monopsony setting. The textbook monopsonist does not pay an input price below the
supplier's marginal costs. Facing an upward-sloping supply curve, it suppresses the quantity
of the input it demands in order to pay a lower price. However, it still pays the supplier's
marginal cost at the reduced level demanded (it just pays marginal cost at a different part
of the supplier's cost curve).
44 Expressly dealing with the question of exclusionary conduct would have been helpful.
Kartell's silence on this issue has made it easier for subsequent courts to misread the
opinion as permitting any non-predatory insurance contracting practices, even in the
presence of substantial market power. This is too broad an interpretation and one that
is contrary to established doctrine (predation is not the only test for monopsony conduct).
Other contracting practices, such as exclusive dealing arrangements or most-favored-nation
clauses, may well have exclusionary effect and could therefore be the basis of Section 2
liability even in the absence of predation. See discussion infra notes 62-63 and accompany-
ing text.
45 If anything, one might expect that a "predatory" monopsonist acting to exclude a
current competitor or deter new entry would pay more, not less to suppliers, and subse-
quently attempt to recoup its losses by reducing price after its exclusive buying position
had been restored. More credible predatory tactics would likely involve efforts to raise
rivals' costs. Frech, however, advocates a different position. He claims that Blue Shield's
low prices and its ban on balance billing, combined with the Blues' large market share
and commitment to complete first-dollar insurance coverage, worked to exclude the entry
of competing private insurers. See Frech, supra note 4, at 306 n.15. The persuasiveness of
this scenario relies, in part, on the difficulties physicians would have in shifting to non-
Blue Shield insurers, given the size of Blue Shield's market share. Id. at 304-05. This kind
of "lumpiness" in medical markets could well lead to surprising, non-textbook results.
46 It is true that the new entrant would have higher costs than the monopsonist. This,
in turn, would constrain the degree of price competition that entry would engender.
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court record. Most of Breyer's focus on price is of a doctrinal, not an
empirical, nature. Thus, the axioms recited are plentiful. Antitrust rules
cannot and should not turn on the reasonableness of the price in ques-
tion, he cautions, observing that "normally the choice of what to seek
to buy and what to offer to pay is the buyer's."4 7 "Courts only rarely
try to supervise the price bargain directly,"" Breyer notes, expressing
particular concern about judicial intervention because "the prices at
issue here are low prices, not high prices."4 9
A final important theme in Breyer's opinion is that of antitrust
channeling-defining a division of labor between state regulation and
federal common law oversight of private markets by antitrust courts. 0
Breyer consciously refrains from extending antitrust law into the health
care domain.
The rising costs of medical care, the possibility that patients cannot
readily evaluate (as competitive buyers) competing offers of medical
service, the desirability of lowering insurance costs and premiums, the
availability of state regulation to prevent abuse-all convince us that
we ought not create new potentially far-reaching law on the subject.
And, the parties have not seriously argued to the contrary.5'
Breyer's basic objection is to using antitrust law as a smokescreen for
judicial regulation, as opposed to using it in order to ensure meaningful
competition.5 2 At the same time, the opinion reflects skepticism on
Breyer's part-not universally shared among antitrustjudges-regarding
competition as an effective force in health care. 5 With that subtext,
seven years of antitrust litigation came to an end.
47 Kartell VI, 749 F.2d at 927-29.
48 Id. at 928.
49 Id. at 930.
50 See infra Part IV.
51 Kartell VII, 749 F.2d at 928.
52 During Breyer's academic career, of course, he had become expert in regulation and
understood its limitations. See, e.g., STEPHEN G. BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE:
TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993); STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM (1982). Other antitrust courts have been less cautious in breaching the antitrust-
regulatory divide. See, e.g., FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1296
(W.D. Mich. 1996) (allowing the two largest hospitals in Grand Rapids to merge on
condition that they comply with a highly regulatoryjudicial order to refrain from exploiting
their newly acquired market power). For a general evaluation of Breyer's antitrust analysis
on the bench see Edward Fallone, The Clinton Court Is Open for Business: The Business Law
Jurisprudence of Justice Stephen Breyer, 59 Mo. L. REv. 857, 867-72 (1994).
-1 See PeterJ. Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 611-14 (2002) [hereinafter Health Care Quality and the Courts]
(finding that the majority of antitrust courts assert the textbook virtues of competition
in health care cases).
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C. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF BUYER-SIDE MARKET POWER
AFTER KARTELL
Justice Breyer's decision in Kartell has been influential. Although Brey-
er's analysis was a contextualized assessment of antitrust issues in the
complicated political and regulatory environment of Massachusetts, most
courts have read Kartell as stating black letter principles capable of rote
application. It is usually the starting point, and often the ending point,
of antitrust analysis of health insurance practices. As a consequence,
courts have failed to develop a sophisticated framework for evaluating
buyer-side market power in health care.
The mantra that insurers stand in the shoes of those they insure and
bargain on their behalf is now widely recited. In Ball Memorial Hospital,
for example, Judge Easterbrook cites Kartell for the statement that "the
Blues are financial intermediaries, purchasing agents for the consumers
of medical services." 4 Nor does he limit the scope of insurer agency to
matters of price. "The Blues, as financial intermediaries, may drive any
bargains open to consumers of services." 5  Similarly, subsequent First
Circuit decisions lost sight of the fact that Breyer was using the "purchas-
ing agent" metaphor to shed light on a complicated set of economic
relationships, not to synthesize specific empirical evidence into a conclu-
sive statement of fact. The opinion in Ocean State Physicians Health Plan
v. Blue Cross declares: "We held [in Kartell] that, for antitrust purposes,
a health insurer like Blue Shield must be viewed 'as itself the purchaser
of the doctors' services.' ,,56 Even some cases dealing with modern man-
aged care, rather than old-fashioned Blues plans and fee-for-service medi-
cine, have rotely echoed Kartell.57
Subsequent cases have read Kartell as extending insurers almost
unquestioned deference to negotiate lower input prices. In Ocean State,
the court reasoned that "a health insurer's unilateral decisions about
the prices it will pay providers do not violate the Sherman Act-unless
the prices are 'predatory' or below incremental cost-even if the insurer
54 784 F.2d at 1325.
55 Id.
5 883 F.2d 1101, 1111 (1st Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). See als0Westchester Radiological
v. Empire Blue Cross, 707 F. Supp. 708, 712 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("For antitrust purposes,
Blue Cross is treated as a buyer where it pays the bill and seeks to set the amount to be
charged."), aff'd, 884 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1989).
-7 Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7274 at *27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996),
vacated, remanded, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1048 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1997), on remand, sub noma.
Finkelstein v. Aetna Health Plans, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10759 (1997), afl'd, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 12493 (1998).
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is assumed to have monopoly power in the relevant market. '5 8 An even
stronger statement of Kartell's holding can be found in Finkelstein v. Aetna
Health Plans: "The crux of the Kartell line of cases is that in the complex
context of health insurance contracts, no antitrust liability lies where an
insurer 'pays the bill and seeks to set the amount [and the terms] for
the charge."'' 9 The defendants in United States v. Delta Dental of Rhode
Island went so far as to assert a rule of per se legality, in light of Kartell,
for all buyer behavior short of predation. 6° The district court, however,
correctly rejected this suggestion.6'
The focus on price and predation has led to a related failing. Courts
have paid insufficient attention to exclusionary conduct in assessing
buyer-side market power. In Ocean State, the First Circuit considered
whether Blue Cross's Prudent Buyer policy (containing a most-favored-
nation clause) was "exclusionary" in violation of Section 2. The court
answered in the negative: "[A] policy of insisting on a supplier's lowest
price-assuming that the price is not 'predatory' or below the supplier's
incremental cost-tends to further competition on the merits and, as a
matter of law, is not exclusionary."62 The court reasoned that this out-
come was "compelled" by Kartell, ignoring that Blue Cross's Prudent
Buyer policy could be exclusionary in ways quite different from the
prohibition against balance billing at issue in the earlier case.63
58 Ocean State, 883 F.2d at 1110-11. A problem with this definition is that no rational
supplier would sell below its marginal cost, even to a monopsonist, unless it (rather than
the monopsonist) were being predatory. See supra, note 43.
19 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10759, at *14 (alteration in original).
60 "Delta contends that these decisions [Kartell and Ocean State] stand for the straightfor-
ward proposition that MFN clauses, absent pricing that is predatory or below incremental
cost, are competitive as a matter of law." United States v. Delta Dental of R.I., 943 F. Supp.
172,186 (D.R.I. 1996) (declining to hold that a most-favored-customer clause in a dominant
insurer's fee contracts with participating dentists was presumptively procompetitive). In
other contexts, MFN clauses can facilitate horizontal coordination among sellers, particu-
larly in concentrated industries. See ROBERT PITOFSKY, HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID & DIANE
P. WOOD, TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 529-31 (5th ed. 2003)
61 The magistrate judge, although bound by First Circuit precedent, rejected Delta's
claim. "Despite Kartelland Ocean State'sbroad language, these decisions, properly construed,
fail to establish a per se validation of MFN clauses in all cases where pricing is not predatory
or below incremental cost." Id. at 189. The district court, over Delta's objection, adopted
the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. But cf Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d at 1415
("'Most favored nations' clauses are standard devices by which buyers try to bargain for
low prices ... and that is the sort of conduct the antitrust laws seek to encourage.")
(Posner, J.).
62883 F.2d at 1110.
63 A prohibition against balance billing might facilitate entry into the market for insur-
ance by making a newcomer's price more attractive to providers, whereas an MFN can be
used to deter entry by competitors because a supplier's decision to discount marginal
units for a new entrant would require it to discount inframarginal units as well. Even if
one were to conclude that an MFN is procompetitive and not exclusionary, as can be the
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Kartell and its progeny provide an inadequate basis for evaluating
medical monopsony power, particularly in a world of managed care.
What is called for, however, is not a rejection of Kartell but an apprecia-
tion of its rationale and limitations in light of traditional economic
principles regarding buyer-side market power.
II. KARTELL AS AN ECONOMIC PROBLEM:
STANDARD MONOPSONY THEORY
The core insight of Breyer's opinion in Kartell is that Blue Shield
was not a "third force" intervening between physician-sellers of medical
services and patient-buyers, but was itself a purchaser. The outcome of
the case thus turns on the court's analysis of the agency relationship
between insurer and patient. To Breyer, the insurer's role as purchasing
agent is straightforward: Blue Shield negotiates a favorable price for
physician services that patients require. Breyer analogizes this function
to other situations in which an agent with superior information or bar-
gaining power-in his examples, a parent, landlord, or corporate
employer-makes payment on behalf of a principal party with whom it
has a pre-existing relationship. 64
Because the case involves insurance benefits rather than more typical
goods or services, Breyer never sees Blue Shield as buying inputs from
suppliers in order to create and sell a final product to consumers. Two
decades of hindsight with respect to the evolution of the health insurance
industry reveal this to be a staggering omission. Managed care is all
about integrating the financing and delivery of health care services into
a single product. Moreover, market structure and competition have direct
implications for the fidelity of Breyer's principal-agent relationship
between insurer and insured. The exercise of monopsony power can be
a form of agency failure, particularly if it contributes to higher prices
or reduced output in the final product market. The monopsonist maxi-
mizes its own surplus, not the surplus or utility of its customers.
Simplifying the insurer-insured agency relationship leads Breyer to
short-circuit the standard economic analysis of monopsony. In the court's
discussion of price, for example, Breyer does not specify whether the
case, it would require analysis quite different from that implicated in Kartell. See generally
Jonathan B. Baker, Vertical Restraints Among Hospitals, Physicians and Health Insurers that
Raise Rivals' Costs: A Case Study of Reazin v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc.
and Ocean State Physicians Health Plan, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode
Island, 14 AM. J.L. & MED. 147 (1988).
14 Kartell VII, 749 F.2d at 925. The fact of the pre-existing relationship allows Breyer to
distinguish these examples, and Blue Shield's conduct, from situations where otherwise
independent buyers enter into "sham" group purchasing arrangements in order to exercise
market power. Id.
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prices under review are in the input market or the final product market.
Some passages suggest a belief that Blue Shield's conduct produces lower
prices in the end-market, such as when Breyer notes that "courts at least
should be cautious-reluctant to condemn too speedily-an arrange-
ment that, on its face, appears to bring low price benefits to the con-
sumer."65 Unfortunately, Breyer cites no record evidence to defend this
assertion as an empirical proposition. In most instances of monopsony
power, moreover, Breyer's contention is false as a theoretical matter. 66
There is a fundamental need for antitrust courts to go back to basics
and assess buyer-side market power in light of standard economic under-
standings of monopsony power and established exceptions to such an
analysis.
A. ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF MONOPSONY POWER
A monopsonist is simply a monopoly buyer rather than a monopoly
seller. Just as the monopolist facing a downward-sloping demand curve
can raise prices and profits by restricting output in the final product
market, the monopsonist facing an upward-sloping supply curve can
depress the price of the input by restricting the quantity of its purchases.
Graphically, monopsony problems appear identical to monopoly
problems-only upside down and backwards.67 This apparent familiarity
can be dangerous. As Mark Pauly cautions, it not easy to think straight
while standing on one's head, and "intuition can easily (and persuasively)
be led in the wrong direction." 68
Because the monopsonist buys fewer inputs, it produces less output
in the final product market than would sellers under competitive condi-
tions. Accordingly, monopsony markets are allocatively inefficient and
are associated with a deadweight loss comparable to that of monopoly.69
65 Id. at 931. One assumes that the court was not merely equating the direct effect of a
ban on balance billing-reduced out-of-pocket costs to patients-with reduced total costs
to consumers of health insurance (i.e., premiums plus out-of-pocket costs). Even though
patients receive medical services directly from physicians, those services are nonetheless
"inputs" from the perspective of health insurance.
6 See discussion infra note 70 and accompanying text.
67 For a graphic illustration of the classic monopsony problem, see Roger D. Blair &Jill
Boylston Herndon, Physician Cooperative Ventures: An Economic Analysis, infra this issue, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 989, 999 (Figure 2) (2004).
6 Mark V. Pauly, Monopsony Power in Health Insurance: Thinking Straight While Standing on
YourHead, 6J. HEALTH ECON. 73, 73-74 (1987) [hereinafter Thinking Straight] ("Although
monopsony is, at least at the level of abstract theory, closely related to the well-known
positive and normative theory of monopoly, lack of familiarity with its practical application
in health insurance markets can make analysis difficult, counterintuitive, or potentially
erroneous.").
I See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Public Policy: Cooperative Buying, Monopsony
Power, and Antitrust Policy, 86 Nw. U. L. RPv. 331,335-36 (1992) (illustrating the deadweight
loss associated with monopsony power).
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Significantly, consumers of the final product made by a monopsonist
typically do not benefit from the monopsonist's exercise of market power.
The fact that the monopsonist pays less for supplies in the input market
need not mean that the monopsonist will charge lower prices in the
final product market. Indeed, the opposite is generally the case.
70
In health care, monopsony buyers are typically large insurance compa-
nies (or government payers like Medicare). The input market consists
of suppliers of medical services-hospitals, physicians, pharmaceuticals,
etc.-necessary to treat insured patients. Pauly uses a "final product"
metaphor to model the problem:
When an insurance policy provides full coverage, and when the insurer
may affect the unit price or quantity of service, it is obviously natural
to think of the market as delivering a single product-insured medical
care-in return for a lump sum (insurance) premium. The insured
may have some choice as to which of many possible providers to use,
but the final result is as if the insurer bought the medical services (as
inputs) at prices which the insurer may be able to affect, and in quanti-
ties over which it may have some control, and then in effect resold this
package to the insured patient in return for the insurance premium.
It is as ifdoctors, hospitals, or other providers are "upstream" producers
of inputs which are combined with insurance to produce a final
product."1
This vertical set of relationships, in which health care providers are
suppliers of a product that is repackaged and sold by insurance compa-






70 See Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL
L. REv. 297, 306 (1991) ("Ironically, the reduced input prices the monopsonist enjoys do
not lead to reduced output prices. In fact, when the monopsonist has market power in
the output market, the reduced input prices cause higher output prices."). See also HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE,
§ 1.2b, at 13-16 (2d ed. 1999). When inputs are used in fixed proportions, a monopsonist
that sells in a competitive market will charge the same competitive price, but will produce
less than a non-monopsonist firm. Id. at 15. A monopsonist that resells in a cartelized or
monopoly market will charge a higher than competitive price. Id.
71 Mark V. Pauly, Market Power, Monopsony, and Health Insurance Markets, 7 J. HEALTH
ECON. 111, 113 (1988) [hereinafter Market Power and Monopsony] (emphasis added).
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The insurance monopsonist in the upstream input market will almost
always be a monopolist in the downstream insurance market, implying
that the monopsony problem cannot be viewed in isolation. 72 In addition,
medical providers may possess and exercise market power in the
upstream market. This is more likely to be true for hospitals than physi-
cians because there are fewer hospitals in each geographic market, but
it may apply as well to certain physician specialties. As a result, models
of monopsony power must sometimes be combined with models of
bilateral monopoly bargaining.
Price
XB XA XE Xc Quantity of
Medical Services
Figure 113
Pauly analyzes these problems and sketches a number of possible
equilibria. There is a possible competitive equilibrium where neither
insurance companies nor medical providers have market power
(point C). There is a possible equilibrium where a passive monopsony
72Id. at 113.
73 Id. at 116 (Figure 1).
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insurance company (or a competitive insurance market) faces active
upstream monopoly medical providers (point A). There is a possible
equilibrium where an active monopsony insurer faces passive upstream
monopoly providers (or a competitive upstream provider market) (point
B) .74 Finally, there is a possible equilibrium where an integrated provider-
insurer exercises its market power, but only in the final product market
(point E). Conceptually, point E can be thought of either as the tradi-
tional Blue Cross-Blue Shield situation of a dominant insurer being held
captive to provider interests, or as a large managed care company that
directly employs medical providers for its own benefit.
Welfare economics can shed light on the relative desirability of these
equilibria. Not surprisingly, the competitive equilibrium is preferable
(in the absence of other market failures). Market power anywhere in
the stream of production typically produces inefficiency. However, point
E, the single integrated monopolist, is preferable to points A or B.
One vertical monopoly is typically better than two separate monopolies
because it avoids distortions associated with multiple markups. 75 Signifi-
cantly, it is not possible to make general statements about the degree
of inefficiency associated with point A compared to point B. Which is
worse in practice depends upon the relative elasticities of supply and
demand.
Equally important for antitrust purposes, it is not possible to infer
positive welfare effects from the simple observation that payments to
medical providers have been reduced. Moving from point A to points
B, C, or E are all associated with reduced payments for inputs, but
not all moves improve total welfare. As Pauly remarks, "Ultimately, the
resolution of the question of whether efficiency is improved by aggressive
74 While acknowledging that downstream health care monopsonists are likely to face
upstream monopolists, in assuming passive monopolists versus active monopsonists and
vice versa (points A and B), Pauly does not deal with the problem of bilateral monopoly.
In their article in this issue, Blair and Herndon contend that monopoly medical providers
facing a monopsonist buyer will negotiate their way to the same outcome as the integrated
provider (point E in Pauly's figure). See Blair & Herndon, supra note 67. As such, if the
bilateral monopoly negotiations are not undermined by strategic behavior, it provides an
interesting example of where countervailing power could lead to a welfare improvement.
Two market failures are sometimes better than one. Unfortunately, antitrust law is not
always well equipped to deal with this possibility. See generally Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust
Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best
Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. Rxv. 849 (2000).
75 As suggested by Blair & Herndon, supra note 67, formal integration or merger is not
the only way to internalize the externalities associated with double markups. One can
imagine various contractual mechanisms short of merger that could accomplish similar
ends. Bargaining in the shadow of bilateral monopoly, however, is notoriously unpredict-
able. See generally Richard Friedman, Antitrust Analysis and Bilateral Monopoly, 1986 Wisc.
L. REv. 873 (1986).
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insurers who exercise market power against providers must be empiri-
cal. ' 76 In other words, this is not an area where policy makers or antitrust
courts can safely trust their intuitions. 77
B. KARTELL'S WELFARE ANALYSIS AND BREYER'S
TREATMENT OF PRICE
How does standard monopsony analysis apply to Kartell? In the classic
monopsony model, the buyer faces an upward-sloping supply curve and
obtains lower input prices by suppressing the level of its purchases.
There is no gain in productive efficiency. A monopsonist health insurer
therefore purchases fewer physician services at a lower cost, and lowers
output in the final product market (i.e., health insurance benefits).
Moreover, because health insurance monopsonists typically are also
monopolists, lower input prices do not lead to lower consumer output
prices. As a general proposition, therefore, monopsony power decreases
rather than increases economic welfare.
Breyer's opinion has been fairly criticized for inferring positive welfare
effects simply from the fact that Blue Shield reduced its input prices for
physician services. 78 The record supports the conclusion that Blue Shield
was able to obtain lower physician fees and therefore lower prices in the
input market. 79 There is no record evidence, however, that lower fees
paid to physicians resulted in lower premiums for Blue Shield subscribers,
and Breyer certainly referenced no evidence about the adequacy of
output.8 0
In this respect, Breyer was simply mistaken to believe that possible
market power on the part of Blue Shield had no antitrust significance.
Moreover, vigilant application of the antitrust laws to facilitate competi-
tion among insurers is necessary to safeguard the integrity of the insurer-
insured agency relationship. The competitiveness of the insurance
industry was among the factors the Supreme Court identified in FTC v.
76 Pauly, Market Power and Monopsony, supra note 71, at 117.
71 Pauly, Thinking Straight, supra note 68, at 73-74.
78 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 70, at 14-15. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy
After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213, 257 (1985). To infer positive welfare effects from
lower input prices alone, one would have to tell credible stories about the significance of
state rate regulation, or possibly Blue Shield's nonprofit status on the insurer's behavior.
See infra Part IV.
7' Kartell VI, 582 F. Supp. at 741 (reporting that Blue Shield's fixed schedule of physician
fees was 30% below the physicians' standard charges).
80 Lower prices in the final product market are strong indications of procompetitive
efficiencies. Higher levels of output can serve similar functions, although measuring "out-
put" in an insurance market is not an easy task.
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Indiana Federation of Dentists for why a demand from an insurance com-
pany for patient x-rays in order to verify the need for dental treatment
could be treated as a demand from consumers themselves.
81
Whatever concern Breyer had for maintaining competitiveness in the
market for health insurance-the market of greatest interest to individ-
ual consumers-was subsumed into a strong resistance to imposing anti-
trust liability for "low [input] prices." Taking its cue from Breyer, the
court in Ocean State cited a Blue Cross estimate that the Prudent Buyer
policy (containing the challenged most-favored-nation clause) saved it
approximately $2 million in input prices. 8 2 There was no evidence, how-
ever, that the reduced input prices were passed along to consumers or
that they led to an expansion of output in Blue Cross's final product
market.8 3 Rather, the court suggested that improved consumer welfare
was not a predicate for absolving the defendant of antitrust liability: "In
the present case, Ocean State alleges that Blue Cross never actually
passed along its savings to subscribers. But nothing turns on whether
Blue Cross in fact lowered its rates. The fact remains that achieving lower
costs is a legitimate business justification under the antitrust laws."84
Whether a reduction in input prices can properly be viewed as an increase
in efficiency and therefore as a legitimate businessjustification, however,
depends upon its origins. If the lower input prices result from the exercise
of monopsony power, then they lead to allocative inefficiency in the
end-market and not to increases in productive efficiency.8 5 This possibility
was not even considered by the court in Ocean State. It is difficult to get
the right answers if you do not ask the right questions.
A wholly defensible antitrust proposition is that no liability should
flow from insurer practices that demonstrably lead to lower consumer
prices in the end-market. Although Breyer's opinion sweeps more
broadly, some courts have viewed Kartell as requiring savings to end-
users. The district court in Westchester Radiological maintained that cost
savings directly benefited Blue Cross subscribers: "Blue Cross produces
lower prices for consumers by using its bargaining power to produce radiol-
81 476 U.S. 447, 463 (1986) ("[Insurers] are themselves in competition for the patronage
of the patients ....").
82 883 F.2d at 1110.
83 The court does assert, without citing supporting evidence in the record, that Blue
Cross's MFN provided it with "more business at lower prices." Id. at 1111.
84 Id. at 1111 n.11. Similarly, in discussing whether the practice was exclusionary, the
court simply classified the price reductions as a legitimate business justification. "[T] he
efficiency justification-lower costs-is evident." Id. at 1112.
85 A monopsonist pays lower input prices. This lowers its average costs, but not its
marginal costs. Thus a profit maximizing monopsonist does not reduce its prices, but
instead, simply earns a higher profit.
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ogy services as part of a bundle of hospital services." 86 Unlike Kartell, the
court in Westchester Radiological credited evidence of this benefit: "[T] o
the extent that consumer welfare is the goal of antitrust, a court should
be hesitant to extend antitrust law to strike down a system that currently
saves consumers about $25 million a year in radiology fees."87 If the
court was correct as a factual matter, then Blue Cross's contracting
practice would be defensible. 88 Not surprisingly, the regulated nature of
the industry that Breyer touches on in Kartell played a significant role
in Westchester Radiological as well. 8
The court in Delta Dental of Rhode Island similarly opted for a narrow
reading of Kartell by limiting it to insurer conduct that produces lower
consumer prices. The court wrote: "Kartell is distinguishable from this
case because the ban on balance billing at issue in Kartell resulted in low
prices for Blue Shield's enrollees, while the Government alleges that
Delta's Prudent Buyer policy at issue here ultimately results in higher
prices for Rhode Island dental services consumers." 90 Delta Dental of Rhode
86 Westchester Radiological, 707 F. Supp. at 710 (emphasis added). The court goes on:
"Blue Cross is simply acting as a rational buyer attempting to get the best possible terms for
its subscribers." See id. at 713 (emphasis added).
87 Id. at 714. Ironically, the opinion then cites Judge Bork for the proposition that the
"real danger for the law is less that predation will be missed than that normal competitive
behavior will be wrongly classified as predatory and suppressed." Id. (citing ROBERT BoRKt,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 7-9 (1978)). The court's consumer welfare analysis here, how-
ever, is highly contingent on public regulation, not free markets, for its validity.
88 707 F. Supp. at 710 n.2. The radiologists contended that they could bill $25 million
more per year if they could bill patients directly. It is not obvious whether (or to what
extent) these reduced costs were associated with an exercise of Blue Cross's market power
(monopsony power mediated through depressing the quantities of the input demanded)
or whether they were due to more sophisticated purchasing by the insurance company.
The opinion makes no direct reference to monopsony power, although the court speaks
of "bargaining power" and "market power" as reasons for the cost reduction. See id. at
710, 713. The court also acknowledges that an active purchaser could reduce costs in
procompetitive ways. "The agreements permit a sophisticated buyer, Blue Cross, to monitor
and predict charges, and permit it to offer cost containment as a service to its less sophisti-
cated, individual subscribers." See id. at 710.
89 The challenged practice in Westchester Radiological was the defendant's insistence on
"bundling" radiologists' professional charges for inpatient radiology services into its pay-
ments to hospitals rather than paying the physicians separately. The court observed: "[T] he
Blue Cross purchasing system attacked here is supervised by state regulators. Although
that supervision may or may not rise to the level needed to invoke the state action exception
to the antitrust laws, there is no dispute that New York State sets the reimbursement rate
that Blue Cross may pay to hospitals for patient care." Id. at 714.
90 943 F. Supp. at 177. This revisionist reading of Kartell carries through the opinion.
See id. at 177 n.5. ("These low prices, however, benefitted Blue Shield enrollees through
lower premium rates."); see Id. at 180 ("But in Kartell, the court found that market power
was irrelevant because Blue Shield was doing nothing more than using market power to
obtain a low price for its enrollees."). This interpretation becomes more defensible if one
focuses simply on the balance billing prohibition and its likely effect on out-of-pocket
consumer payments, rather than the implications of Blue Shield's alleged exercise of
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Island also asserts as one, though not the only, basis for distinguishing
Ocean State that "Ocean State, like Kartell, involved lower consumer
prices."91
Another sensible-and limited-reading of Kartell centers on judicial
skepticism and self-restraint. Fear of chilling procompetitive behavior
not infrequently induces antitrust courts to create doctrinal firewalls.9
2
While a monopsonist obtains lower input prices by suppressing the level
of its purchases and not by improving productive efficiency, there are
many procompetitive ways that a health insurer can reduce costs. These
include the standard managed care toolkit: utilization review, financial
incentives, and selective contracting. Indeed, in Kartell, Blue Shield
argued that it brought better information to bear on policy decisions
than that possessed by individual consumers.93 Therefore, antitrust courts
must be able to distinguish pro- from anticompetitive sources of lower
costs.
This analysis is difficult because health care "costs" and the very notion
of the "supply curve" for medical services are such ill-defined concepts.
The district court in Kartell, for example, found that the supply of doctors
in Massachusetts had in fact risen steadily over the time in question.
94
This would tend to suggest that monopsony power was not being exer-
cised because lower-than-competitive monopsony rates should deter phy-
sician entry into the market. Unfortunately, there are so many other
factors that could influence the number of physicians in a market that
few inferences can defensibly be made from this fact alone.
If Kartellreaches the correct result, it is because other factors restrained
Blue Shield from exploiting its monopoly power vis-A-vis consumers. Blue
Shield was a nonprofit entity created by state statute. Some antitrust
courts have reasoned that nonprofit hospitals will not exercise market
power in the same manner as for-profit entities,95 although nonprofits
enjoy no general antitrust immunity.96 Blue Shield's nonprofit status
monopsony power in the input market. "In Kartell, Blue Shield's ban on balance billing
clearly saved subscribers from incurring additional provider costs." Id. at 191 n.4.
91 Id. at 178.
92 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. and Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
93 "Blue Shield also claims that whatever power it possess arises from its ability as an
,expert' to prevent doctors from charging unknowledgeable consumers more than a free
(and informed) market price." Kartell VII, 749 F. 2d at 927.
94 Id.
95 Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1295.
96 See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.22 (1984); see also United States v.
Rockford Mem'l Corp., 171 F. Supp. 1251, 1287 (N.D. I11. 1989 ("Accordingly, the court
finds that the defendants 'consumer-aligned' boards and not-for-profit status will not
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afforded subscribers little intrinsic protection. More likely, active state
regulation may have ensured that lower input prices from buyer-side
market power were passed along to consumers. 97 Blue Shield's efforts to
restrict physician fees commenced in 1975 in response to pressure from
the state Insurance Commissioner. 98 With continued state oversight, it
is conceivable that Blue Shield's subscribers were beneficiaries of the
insurer's market power. Still, it remains an empirical question whether
and in what circumstances particular regulations yield measurable con-
sumer benefits, and Breyer fails to cite evidence of this sort. Therefore,
Kartell is best regarded as a potential regulatory exception to the general
rule that monopsony impairs welfare, and not as a template for evaluating
buyer-side market power as a matter of baseline analysis.
Significantly, there are other, less intuitive scenarios in which lodging
monopsony (and monopoly) power in a health insurer-depicted cor-
rectly using Pauly's "final product" approach rather than Breyer's over-
simplification of the insurer-insured agency relationship-may lead to
improved social welfare (or at least no short-term welfare loss). For one,
the classic monopsony model implicitly assumes that the physician's
decision to supply services reflects a discrete, marginal choice. Herndon
persuasively argues that physician supply is better modeled as an "all-or-
none" proposition, not a marginal decision.99 If the physician's supply
decision is "all-or-none," meaning that physicians do not respond to
reduced fees by selectively limiting the quantity or quality of service they
provide to patients whose insurers offer lower compensation, then a
monopsonist like Blue Shield could reduce physician fees to the level
dictated by the average cost curve without suppressing the quantity of
inputs demanded. 100 Importantly, the "all-or-none" model depends upon
the existence of contractual, legal, and professional norms to prevent
physicians from discriminating among patients according to source of
payment.
A second possibility, identified by Blair and Herndon, is that counter-
vailing buyer-side market power could act as a second-best solution to
necessarily prevent the defendants from engaging in and-competitive activity."), affd, 898
F.2d 1278, 1285-86 (7th Cir. 1990).
17 See infra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
98 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
99jill Boylston Herndon, Health Insurer Monopsony Power: The All-or-None Model 21 J.
HEALTH ECON. 197 (2002). This is another example of how various types of lumpiness
in health care markets can lead to non-textbook results.
'
00 While not producing short-term welfare losses, there remain concerns about dynamic
efficiency in the "all-or-none" scenario. Id. at 200 n.4.
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upstream provider market power.'' In the absence of strategic behavior,
negotiations between parties with countervailing market power could
move the market from the isolated upstream provider monopoly equi-
librium (pointA in Pauly's figure) ,102 or the isolated monopsonist equilib-
rium (point B), to the output and quantity decisions of the integrated
monopolist (point E).103 Point E represents a welfare improvement rela-
tive to A or B, although point E is still unambiguously less desirable than
the competitive outcome (point C). This scenario would call for a case-
by-case assessment of the economic effects of buyer-side market power
using a total welfare standard.10 4
A third situation, discussed by Martin Gaynor and colleagues, involves
moral hazard in health insurance.105 It is well established that insured
individuals have less incentive to avoid covered losses, a problem that
manifests itself in health insurance as overuse of expensive, marginally
beneficial medical services rather than failure to protect oneself from
illness or injury. Moreover, insured individuals often rely on the treat-
ment recommendations of physicians and other health professionals
who are paid on a fee-for-service basis. Moral hazard in health insurance
therefore afflicts providers as well as patients. 0 6 Moral hazard is socially
wasteful. A monopsonist that curtails input supply by paying below-
market fees to physicians might counteract both types of moral hazard,
increasing social welfare even if those discounted fees are not passed
on to subscribers in the form of lower premiums. However, an insurer
would have to offer clear evidence of these effects in order for them to
be taken seriously, which would not be easy. 07 To date, antitrust receptiv-
ity to second-best type arguments has been tepid at best.
101 Blair & Herndon, supra note 67.
102 See graph, supra note 73.
103 For a comprehensive discussion of this possibility, see ROGER D. BLAIR &JEFFREY L.
HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 112-21 (1993).
'" Hammer, supra note 74, at 906-14.
105 See Martin Gaynor et al., Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition,
and the Second Best in Health Care Markets, 108J. POL. ECON. 992 (2000).
106 See Sherry Glied, Managed Care, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS IA, at 707,
723-25 (Joseph P. Newhouse & A.J. Culyer eds., 2000). Consequently, there is no reason to
assume that the inflated physician fees in Kartellunder Blue Shield's "usual and customary"
charge system represented the physicians' actual "costs."
107 Gaynor et al., supra note 105 (concluding that welfare-enhancing effects on moral
hazard might occur in noncompetitive but not in competitive insurance markets). In
addition, the specific practice at issue in Kartell balance billing, increases patients' out-
of-pocket co-insurance costs at the point of service and therefore acts as a counterweight
to moral hazard.
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III. KARTELL AS AN AGENCY PROBLEM:
HEALTH CARE COMPLEXITIES
Justice Breyer was wrong to ignore the "final product" model of
monopsony, but he was right to place the agency issue at the heart of
the Kartell dispute. Faithful agency relations, enforced through appro-
priate legal mechanisms, can produce results quite different from those
predicted by conventional economic theory. Analysis of the multiple and
conflicting agency relations in health care, however, is difficult. Lawrence
Casalino provides an exposition of contemporary agency relations in
medical markets that stands in sharp contrast to Breyer's simple buyer-
seller dyad. 0 8 Casalino details not only the relationships traditionally at
the heart of health care (physicians, patients, and insurers), but also the
new wrinkles introduced by managed care, integrated provider practice
groups, and employer sponsorship.
Payors Insurers Providers
Health Plan Government
Government + (as regulator) &
(as purchaser) Accreditors
E >Med group or IPAEmployers .. ,
Patient 4 Physician
Figure 2. Contemporary Principal-Agent Relationships
Patients seldom pay directly for their own insurance coverage. Most
private insurance is obtained through employers, from a limited menu
of choices, while the government structures and finances insurance for
the Medicare and Medicaid populations. Private insurance companies
fund and, in the world of managed care, directly arrange the provision
of medical services to subscriber-patients. At the same time, health care
providers supply both medical services and information to individual
subscriber-patients. 10 9 As the Casalino diagram indicates, the physician-
patient agency relationship is increasingly mediated by medical groups
108 Lawrence Casalino, Managing Uncertainty: Intermediate Organizations as Triple Agents,
26J. HFALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 1055 (2001).




and Individual Practice Associations (IPAs), fundamentally changing the
unit of production for medical services. The diagram also acknowledges
the role of the government in regulating aspects of both the provider-
patient and the insurer-insured agency relationships.'10
Kartell's treatment of health care agency fails to do justice to this multi-
dimensional set of interactions among physicians, patients, employers,
insurers, and the state. Breyer characterizes Blue Shield as nothing more
than the arms-length buyer of physician services. The opinion offers
three concededly "highly simplified examples" as analogies to Blue
Shield's purchasing role and prohibition against balance billing: (1) a
father buying a toy for his son, (2) a landlord hiring a painter to paint
a tenant's room to the tenant's specifications, and (3) a large company
hiring a doctor to treat its employees.111 These examples illustrate the
legitimate point that parties frequently engage in economic transactions
on behalf of others. Nevertheless, one should pause to consider the
applicability of Breyer's examples to insurance for physician services.
Three aspects of health insurance make Breyer's examples troubling.
First, unlike a father or a landlord, a health insurer is acting as an agent
for a collective body of subscribers. The insurer as agent must provide
an effective mechanism for aggregating and expressing the preferences
of its insureds. Second, there is typically a separate, pre-existing agency
relationship between the physician and the patient. There is no compara-
ble relationship between the son and the toy company or the tenant
and the painter. This point also distinguishes some of Breyer's other
insurance examples, such as when auto insurers pay for work in repair
shops."' Third, in many important respects, the health insurer as agent
is supposed to act on behalf of the insured's interest, not its self-interest.
This is true of the father, who bears a fiduciary relationship to the minor
child, but not of the landlord. In a world of managed care, moreover,
the insurer must navigate an increasing number of conflicts of interest
created when the financing function (traditional insurance) is integrated
110 Democratic governance is itself a form of principal-agent relations, the failure of
which can complicate economic analysis of public regulation because of the influence of
special-interest groups. See generally Roger G. Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of
Regulation, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1253 (Richard Schmalensee &
Robert Willig eds., 1989); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism,
99 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1986). The fact that health care markets function in the shadow
of the law will be explored in greater detail in the next section. See infra Part IV.
"I Kartell VII, 749 F.2d at 925.
112 Id. at 925 ("Seventh Circuit has permitted auto insurance companies to furnish
direct reimbursement to repair shops as payment for the repair services provided to
policyholders.") (citing Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 660 F.2d 1195
(7th Cir. 1981)).
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with the direct provision of medical services. Company doctors face
similar pressures, but Breyer does not address them.
13
From an antitrust perspective, a third party acting as a purchasing
agent for a single customer is a substantially different problem than an
insurance company collectively purchasing on behalf of a large group
of subscribers. A closer analogy might be a league of parents seeking to
buy toys on behalf of all their children or a union of landlords purchasing
painting services for all of their buildings. Breyer is aware that a price-
fixing agreement between otherwise independent buyers may masquer-
ade as a purchasing organization 1 4 and that a purchasing organization
may serve as a front for the collective action of sellers." 5 However, Breyer
shows no concern for other collective aspects of group purchasing.
The claim here is not that collective purchasing necessarily creates
antitrust problems. Group purchasing often enhances efficiency."16 More-
over, if one applies the final product model, all manufacturers standard-
ize their product offerings; even the menu of options associated with
automobile purchasing reflects aggregate rather than individual prefer-
ences. However, health insurance has several attributes that make collec-
tive purchasing problematic from an economic, if not an antitrust,
perspective.
The primary function of health insurance is to pool risk and thereby
reduce it. 117 However, pure indemnity insurance is a thing of the past.
"Selective contracting" has been the most successful aspect of modem
managed care, at least financially, because it allows direct insurer-
provider bargaining over fees. Network-model health maintenance orga-
nizations and insurers offering "preferred provider" products, which
together represent the modal form of private insurance, aggressively
negotiate discounts with physicians and hospitals in advance. Blue Shield
and Blue Cross traditionally have set provider fees because of their history
as "service benefit plans" that were obligated to provide covered services
113 See generally ELAINE DRAPER, THE COMPANY DOCTOR (2003).
"I Kartell VII, 749 F.2d at 925 (citing Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940)).
"- Kartell VII, 749 F.2d at 749 (citing Va. Acad. of Clinical Psychologists v. Blue Shield
of Va., 624 F. 2d 476 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding Blue Shield to be a combination not of its
subscribers, but of its physicians)).
116 See generally Clark C. Havighurst, Antitrust Issues in the Joint Purchasing of Health Care,
1995 UTAH L. REv. 409 (1995).
"7 On the other hand, medical savings accounts and other forms of "consumer-directed"
coverage appear to be growing in popularity. SeeJon Gabel, Anthony T. Lo Sasso & Thomas




directly to subscribers. However, even "Blues"' plans have become more
selective in determining which providers participate in their panels. This
limits consumer choice and reduces insurer fidelity to individual patient
preferences in the name of serving collective subscriber interests (lower
costs). 1 8 The close connection between health coverage and the work-
place arguably magnifies these effects; employers' perceptions and pref-
erences may distort insurer contracting practices and further distance
competitive outcomes from true consumer preferences."19 Moreover, the
purchasing and risk-pooling functions may be in tension with each other
if certain negotiating practices designed to prevent adverse selection
(thereby benefiting the insurance pool) detract from individual quality
of care or patient responsiveness.
None of these complicating factors made their way into the Kartell
analysis. Indeed, Breyer excluded from his competitive inquiry even the
obvious agency relationship that exists between physicians and patients.
Physicians not only provide medical care, but also refer, prescribe, and
recommend a range of products and professional and institutional ser-
vices.2 0 Some patients choose insurers in order to maintain covered
access to physicians with whom they enjoy longstanding relations. Even
when a subscriber seeks care for the first time from a physician, and has
been directed to him or her by the insurer, the patient-physician bond
is ethically, legally, and practically independent of both the contract of
coverage between the subscriber and the insurer and the participating
provider agreement between the physician and the insurer.
In Kartell, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that, because of
prevailing prohibitions on the "corporate practice" of medicine and the
obligations physicians owe directly to patients, Blue Shield as an insur-
ance company should not be viewed as the "buyer" of physician services. 12 1
Breyer wrote:
In our view, however, any such distinction is irrelevant for antitrust
purposes. The relevant antitrust facts are that Blue Shield pays the bill
and seeks to set the amount of the charge. Those facts led other courts
118 Even with nonselective networks, subscribers' preferences "ex ante" when purchasing
coverage as potential patients and "ex post" when seeking and receiving care as actual
patients may differ considerably.
119 See generally MARK V. PAULY, HEALTH BENEFITS AT WORK (1997).
10 It is well known that physicians control roughly two-thirds of overall personal health
care spending in the United States through these mechanisms, even though physicians'
fees account for only about 20% of the total. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES 2003 at 310 (giving the percentage distribution of
national health care expenditures by category of service) (2003) (DHHS Pub. No.
2003-1232).
121 Kartell VII, 749 F. 2d at 926.
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in similar circumstances to treat insurers as if they were "buyers." The
same facts convince us that Blue Shield's activities are like those of a
buyer. Whether for ethical, medical, or related professional purposes
Blue Shield is, or is not, considered a buyer is beside the point. We
here consider only one specific argued application of the antitrust laws
and we do not suggest how Blue Shield ought to be characterized in
any other context. 22
However, the court does not attempt to apportion purchasing authority,
or other agency responsibility, between insurers and physicians.
To a degree, it is understandable that federal antitrust courts rarely
dwell on the patient-provider relationship. Not only is it governed by a
separate regulatory structure based largely on state law and professional
self-regulation, but antitrust courts have so frequently been called upon
to scrutinize physician conduct for anticompetitive effects (price-fixing
agreements and group boycotts) that they may be unduly dismissive of
physicians as faithful agents of patients in an economic sense. 123 Still,
the last sentence of Breyer's quoted comment is intriguing. Recall that
the sole practice being challenged in the suit was the ban on balance
billing-the insurer setting the price of physician services and prohibit-
ing additional charges to patients. While other language in the opinion
suggests a broader right of the insurer as purchasing agent to strike
deals on behalf of insureds affecting quality as well as price, 124 whenever
Breyer feels pressured in his argument, he retreats to a narrower focus
on price. 25 Indeed, it is likely that Breyer's implicit faith in the integrity of
the physician-patient agency relationship and its ability to independently
safeguard patient care made him more comfortable in freeing up insurers
to act aggressively with regard to price. This move is defensible, however,
only to the extent that quality is an exogenous concern, compartmental-
ized outside of and, therefore, unaffected by market activity.
As health insurance arrangements become more varied and intricate,
conflicts of interest emerge between insurer and consumer interests,
especially regarding the contract between insurer and physician that is
122 Id.
123 See William M. Sage et al., Why Competition Law Matters to Health Care Quality, HEALTH
An'., Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 31, 38 (applying this reasoning to cases like Kartell).
124 "To find an unlawful restraint, one would have to look at Blue Shield as if it were a
'third force,' intervening in the marketplace in a manner that prevents willing buyers and
sellers from independently coming together to strike price/quality bargains." Kartell VII, 749
F.2d at 924 (emphasis added).
125 See, e.g., id. at 931 ("They do, however, counsel us against departing from present
law or extending it to authorize increased judicial supervision of the buyer/seller price
bargain." (emphasis added)). Other aspects of the opinion expressly address, and reject,
quality claims. However, the plaintiffs' quality-related arguments dealt with dynamic effi-
ciency and innovation-the fear that a rigid price schedule would deter experimentation
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at the heart of Kartell. Relatively speaking, Breyer had it easy. He could
focus on the insurer-insured agency relationship without considering its
effects on the physician-patient agency relationship. With the growth of
managed care, and consequently the integration of health care financing
with health care delivery, the "participating provider agreement" serves
goals other than merely negotiating a low per-service price. Among other
things, the provider may be called on to coordinate an array of medical
services, may be offered financial incentives to conserve on treatment
expense, may be subjected to insurer review of the necessity of recom-
mended care, and may even be required to comply with specific clinical
guidelines. Many of these provisions run counter to the specific prefer-
ences of the insured patient. At the extreme, the insurer may become the
health care provider, as in closed-panel HMOs. In these situations, it is
much harder to accept Breyer's description of the insurer as merely a
purchasing agent.
The related Ambroze and Finkelstein decisions illustrate how antitrust
courts applying Kartell continue to shortchange agency questions, not-
withstanding the growth of managed care. The physician plaintiffs were
groups of anesthesiologists working at hospitals that had contracts with
Aetna and were seeking changes to Aetna's standard physician contract.2 6
Aetna refused, and threatened to terminate its contracts with the physi-
cians' respective hospitals. Under pressure from the hospitals, the physi-
cians signed the standard contract but then brought suit. The complaint
alleged various antitrust violations, as well as state law claims for tortiously
interfering with the contractual relations with their respective hospitals.
This case is interesting because it raises antitrust questions about
physician-patient-insurer agency relationships in the wake of Kartell. The
plaintiffs mainly objected to a clause in the contract permitting termina-
tion by the insurer without cause, which they maintained "was intended
to stifle the independent, professional judgment of physicians, who ordi-
narily compete on the basis of quality of service, among other things
... [and] permitted Aetna to reduce the quality of patient care." 127
Unlike a ban on balance billing which concerns price only, the plaintiffs
alleged that this clause adversely affected the clinical quality of care, as
well as interfered with fundamental aspects of the physician-patient
relationship.
and market entry. Id. at 929. These arguments did not address insurer-imposed constraints
that would directly affect the quality of clinical dimensions of care.
12' Ambroze, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7274 at *1-*2.
127 Finkelstein, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10759 at *6. See also Ambroze, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7274, at *1-*2. (noting plaintiffs' argument that the standard contracts "undermine ...
[Vol. 71
MONOPSONY AND HEALTH CARE
Nonetheless, the Ambroze opinion relied heavily on Breyer's decision
in Kartell in granting Aetna's motion to dismiss the antitrust claim. The
court classified the insurer as the "buyer" of physician services for the
patient,128 and therefore concluded that the "only restraint is the one
that flows inevitably and properly from the choice by [Aetna] to buy
services and products of a particular type from doctors."' 29 The broader
scope of the insurer's agency obligations and the extent to which those
obligations might conflict with the traditional physician-patient relation-
ship did not alter the court's antitrust analysis. 30 As the court observed:
"The fact that their Complaint is dressed up in terms of competition
for better quality services rather than price competition does not differen-
tiate this case from the logic of cases like Kartell and Westchester Radiologi-
cal."13' Nuances attributable to the managed care environment in which
the case arose, such as the possible implications of the contract provision
for clinical quality, were lost on the court.
IV. A REGULATORY EXPLANATION FOR KARTELL
Ultimately, the scope and content of antitrust law must depend on
the legal as well as the economic environment in which the challenged
conduct occurs. 132 The outcome in Kartell is dictated more by regulatory
concerns than by economic theories of monopsony power. Breyer devotes
a substantial portion of the opinion justifying his cautious application
of federal antitrust law, in deference to state efforts to restrain rising
health care costs. Unfortunately, courts applying Kartell have not been
sufficiently sensitive to the ways in which the Massachusetts regulatory
climate circa 1980 influenced the First Circuit's reasoning and conclu-
sions, and therefore limit its usefulness as precedent. This is problematic
because radical changes in the health care industry over the past twenty
years have been accompanied by equally dramatic shifts in regulatory
member anesthesiologists' independent professional judgment and restrict their ability
to compete against each other on the basis of quality").
128 "As in Kartell, the Court finds the 'relevant antitrust facts' to be that Aetna 'pays the
bill and seeks to set the amount [and the terms] of the charge.'" Ambroze, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7274, at *19 (alterations in original) (quoting Kartell VII, 749 F.2d at 926).
129 Id. at * 19 (alterations in original) (quoting WestchesterRadiological, 707 F. Supp. at 711).
1-' Id. at *27 ("The basic point.., is that a buyer generally has the right, uninhibited
by antitrust laws, to set the terms of its bargain with the seller.").
131 Id. at *29.
132 In light of this, we have written elsewhere about the need to approach medical
markets from the vantage point of developing a comprehensive competition policy. William
M. Sage & PeterJ. Hammer, A Copernican View of Health Care Antitrust, 65 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 241 (2002); Hammer & Sage, Health Care Quality and the Courts, supra note 53;
William M. Sage & Peter J. Hammer, Competing on Quality of Care: The Need to Develop a
Competition Policy for Health Care Markets, 32 U. Mich. J.L. REFORM 1069 (1999).
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regimes, altering the demands on federal antitrust courts and testing
their competence in new ways.
A. KARTELL-ERA REGULATION
Antitrust courts have substantial discretion in defining their role as
common law overseers of the economy. In highly regulated industries
such as health care, the division of labor between courts and legislatures
is fluid. 133 State action as defined in the established case law removes
only a small subset of regulated activity from the purview of antitrust;
regulation "not amounting to action" is far more common, if less clear-
cut. 134 As illustrated in Breyer's opinion, a number of factors influence
how a judge will exercise this discretion. 135 What is the seriousness of
the social and economic problem being addressed? What is the capacity
of antitrust courts to engage in the substantive evaluation of the claim?
How clear or obvious is the appropriate remedy? How likely is it that
other state actors will address the problem? In Kartell, Breyer notes the
inherent complexity of health care questions and recognizes that their
resolution requires constitutive social choices in addition to standard
economic analyses. 136 He also asserts a comparative advantage on the
part of state regulators to address the "reasonableness" of pricing deci-
133 At one level, the "channeling" function of antitrust law is worked out through the
state action doctrine, doctrines of implied and express repeal, abstention, primaryjurisdic-
tion, and the certification of questions to state courts. However, channeling concerns do
not end at the boundaries of these formal doctrines. In nearly every antitrust case, the
court must exercise discretion with respect to the scope of its own authority.
134 See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97 (1980) (holding that, to qualify for immunity, a challenged restraint must be clearly
articulated and actively supervised by the state). Cf Ogden Nash, Where There's a Will,
There's Velleity, in I'M A STRANGER HERE MYSELF 172-73 (1938) (defining velleity as "low
degree of volition not prompting to action").
135 "These general considerations do not dictate our result in this case. They do, however,
counsel us against departing from present law or extending it to authorize increased
judicial supervision of the buyer/seller price bargain. Like the court in Feldman v. Health
Care Corp., we see'no need to blaze new trails,' 562 F. Supp. at 946. Without such pioneering,
we do not believe the antitrust laws forbid Blue Shield's 'balance billing' practice." Kartell
VI, 749 F.2d at 931 (quoting Feldman v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 562 F. Supp. 941 (N.D.
Ill. 1982)).
13I "[T] he subject matter of the present agreement-medical costs-is an area of great
complexity where more than solely economic values are at stake. How to provide affordable,
high quality medical care is much debated. And, many different solutions-ranging from
stricter regulation to greater reliance on competing service organizations-have been
proposed. See Clark, Why Does Health Care Regulation Fail? 41 MD. L. REv. 1 (1981); A.
Enthovin [sic], HEALTH PLAN (1980). This fact, too, warrantsjudicial hesitancy to interfere."
Kartell VII, 749 F.2d at 931.
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sions, s7 as well as a fear of turning antitrust courts into de facto public
utility commissions." 8
These considerations lead Breyer to abstain from converting a dispute
over rate regulation into an antitrust problem. In this process, his discus-
sion of Blue Shield as the consumer's purchasing agent serves as rational-
ization as much as explanation. Consequently, the logic of Kartell's
holding and its applicability to other fact patterns are contingent upon
the market/regulatory interface in which the antitrust question arises. 13 9
Other policy and economic pressures facing different regulatory struc-
tures could well lead to quite different divisions of labor.
Kartell began as a fight about reimbursement rates, but a fight that
was mediated through state politics, not private markets. Blue Shield's
fee reductions were a result of the Insurance Commissioner's denial of
proposed premium increases. Moreover, the parties did not limit their
battles to the courtroom, as both sides also sought state legislative inter-
vention. In 1976, the Medical Society unsuccessfully lobbied for legisla-
tion forcing Blue Shield to compensate non-participating physicians.
14°
In 1979, the legislature divested the Medical Society of its formal control
of Blue Shield, a vestige of Blue Shield's origins as a provider-controlled
insurer.'4 ' In 1984, while the appeal of the district court's antitrust deci-
sion was pending in front of the First Circuit, the Massachusetts legisla-
ture enacted a law giving Blue Shield express legislative authority to
prohibit balance billing by participating physicians. 42 Blue Shield argued
that the new legislation rendered the controversy moot, an argument
that the court rejected. 43
137 Kartell VII, 749 F.2d at 928 ("And, where monopoly power is regulated, the regulator,
not the court, bears the burden of determining whether prices are reasonable.") (citing
MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 164, §§ 93-94 (designating state regulation of gas and electric rates));
Id. at 929 ("The claim that Blue Shield's price scheme is 'too rigid' because it ignores
qualitative differences among physicians is properly addressed to Blue Shield or to a
regulator, not to a court.").
138 Id. at 927.
139 Hammer & Sage, Health Care Quality and the Courts, supra note 53, at 637-38 (describing
the meeting point between antitrust law and general regulation in terms of an interface,
not a boundary).
140 Law & Ensminger, supra note 4, at 27 n.146.
141 Id. at 28 n.14 7 .
142 Id. at 21 n.106.
145 Kartell VII, 749 F. 2d at 924 (reasoning that even if the court assumed that the new
law immunized future conduct under that state action doctrine, it would not excuse the
practice or balance billing retrospectively, or obviate the need to address the underlying
question of antitrust liability).
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Cost, quality, and access constitute the three domains of traditional
health care regulation. Blue Shield was originally structured and regu-
lated to facilitate access to insurance financing and, therefore, access to
medical services. A nonprofit entity created by state statute, Blue Shield
possessed substantial market share and faced limited competition from
private carriers. Nearly all physicians participated on its panels, and its
insurance products were sold to the public on a non-discriminatory,
community-rated basis. Fee-for-service payment of physicians was the
unchallenged norm, and insurance premiums were subject to regulatory
approval. Blue Shield had no clinical authority, either legally or contrac-
tually. Medical quality was monitored by state licensing, by malpractice
liability, and by professional self-regulation through hospital credential-
ing committees and similar bodies. These were discrete and separate
realms, none of which was governed by private markets.
144
Consequently, Breyer could portray Blue Shield in the Kartell opinion
as merely a "purchasing agent" and could safely ignore potential com-
plexities in the insurer-provider-patient agency relationship. In declaring
that Blue Shield's ban on balanced billing was not an antitrust problem,
Breyer drew obvious comfort from the active involvement of state regula-
tors, particularly in terms of ensuring that savings to Blue Shield were
passed on to consumers.
[T]he price system here at issue is one supervised by state regulators.
While that fact does not automatically carry with it antitrust immunity,
it suggests that strict antitrust scrutiny is less likely to be necessary
to prevent the unwarranted exercise of monopoly power. Of course,
administrative regulation is a highly imperfect process. But, regulation
by judicial decree is not necessarily preferable 45
Though unspoken, the pantheon of state regulatory and professional self-
regulatory measures that could independently safeguard clinical quality
must have also reassured the court. All in all, Breyer displays serious
reservations about competition in health care (particularlywith respect to
quality) 146 and substantial sympathy for the state's regulatory endeavors.
A possible explanation for Breyer's deference to regulation is that
neither the insurer nor provider sides of the market were particularly
144 While Blue Shield's charter promoted access to health insurance, and separate regula-
tions maintained clinical quality, little in the traditional system was designed to control
costs-precipitating the rate regulatory crisis that led to the Kartell litigation.
14 Kartell VII, 749 F.2d at 931 (citations omitted). Breyer's skepticism about the efficacy
of state regulation is justified. Many rate-setting regimes in health care keep prices high
rather than low, either to promote quality and access for the uninsured (cross-subsidies)
or because providers exercise political influence.
146 Id. at 928.
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competitive when Kartell arose. Recall Pauly's diagram of monopsony-
monopoly power set forth above. 147 An integrated insurer-provider
monopolist (Point E) causes less harm to consumers than if market
power is held independently by physicians and/or insurers. This was
essentially the position of Blue Shield when it was controlled by the
Medical Society. Once those ties were loosened, the physician cartel that
Blue Shield presumably had stabilized would have weakened. In that
situation, a truly competitive approach could have ensured, through
antitrust oversight, that Blue Shield did not retain its insurance mo-
nopoly. The result would have been more active price competition for
both insurance and physician services, with the potential for greater
innovation in production and a wider scope of price and nonprice
characteristics.
This, however, was not seriously contemplated when the Kartell litiga-
tion began in 1977. Health insurance was a highly regulated product.
The state Insurance Commission put pressure on Blue Shield to contain
premium growth, and Blue Shield responded by altering its physician
reimbursement formula and related contractual provisions, such as the
balance billing prohibition addressed in Breyer's opinion. That was all.
In Massachusetts circa 1980, there were a few small HMOs, such as
the Harvard Community Health Plan, which had been nurtured by the
Federal HMO Act of 1973. Blue Cross and Blue Shield were the dominant
insurers, whose principal role was to preserve patient access to coverage
through community rating and similarly noncompetitive practices. Blue
Shield was a nonprofit organization, with little incentive to innovate. It
was legally separate from Blue Cross but required to coordinate with it,
which meant there was no way to "assemble" a full-service health insur-
ance product except through established channels. 48 None of the aggres-
sive strategies that would become familiar as managed care-notably
selective contracting, preauthorization requirements, and physician
financial incentives to conserve treatment expense-were in use. Some
were impermissible under state law, as was the "corporate practice" of
medicine generally. 149
147 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
'4 This market division constituted "state action" as a formal matter. See Kartell I, 542
F. Supp. at 788-92.
149 SeeJon A. Gabel, Thomas M. Rice, & Gregory de Lissovoy, The Emergence and Future
of PPOs, 11 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & LAW 305 (1986) (describing relaxation in the 1980s
of laws preventing selective contracting). One vehicle for challenging this strict regulatory
climate was the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which the
Kartell plaintiffs argued preempted the state's attempt after the litigation arose to protect
the balance billing prohibition from antitrust attack through direct legislation. Breyer was
unmoved. Kartell VII, 749 F. 2d at 931-32.
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In other words, the prevailing regulatory model of health insurance in
most states at the time, including Massachusetts, precluded the functional
integration of health care financing with health care delivery that is
characteristic of modern managed care. This reduced opportunities
for productive efficiencies, but also seemingly protected patients from
experiencing changes in quality or access as a result of the lower rates
Blue Shield paid its physicians. It also reassured the Kartell court that
agency-related risks were minimal. 150 Even if the balance billing prohibi-
tion did not constitute "state action" as a doctrinal matter, Blue Shield
was functionally a purchasing agent for patients as politically represented
by the regulatory system, though not as consumers participating in an
unfettered market.
B. MANAGED CARE REGULATION TODAY
In 1984, Breyer plausibly could squeeze physician-patient-insurer rela-
tions into a simple "buyer-seller" dyad and focus on price to the exclusion
of access and quality. Changes in industry structure call these assumptions
into question today. Managed care substantially blurs the line separating
insurance from clinical services. Quality can no longer be viewed as an
exogenous concern, unaffected by market activity. Although widespread
health care regulation persists, competition plays a much larger role
now than when Kartell was decided. Cost, quality, and access are interde-
pendent in a competitive market. Goods and services that trade at higher
prices typically have higher perceived quality. 151 Similarly, competitive
visions of insurance have displaced the communitarian vision inherent
in traditional Blue Cross-Blue Shield coverage. Largely through the active
involvement of private employers as plan sponsors, access to affordable
health insurance has come to be seen as the outcome of market processes,
not government assurances.
How should antitrust law respond to monopsony power in health care
when price and quality are not subject to separate and discrete regulatory
oversight? While substantially less developed than Breyer's argument in
Kartell, the Ambroze and Finkelstein decisions demonstrate a modem court
struggling with a changed regulatory climate and the impact of managed
150 The one wildcard in mandating price reductions for Blue Shield (or any other insurer)
is that physicians will cease participating in the program. This problem is severe among
state Medicaid programs that pay very low per-service fees. See Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid
Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty, and Physician Self-Interest, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 191,
194-202 (1995).
151 The Kartell plaintiffs argued that low fees discouraged them from providing higher
quality care to patients who desired it and from investing in medical innovations. Breyer
rejected this claim, regarding quality as largely unaffected by price competition. Kartell
VII, 749 F.2d at 927.
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care on antitrust analysis of buyer-side market power. In its first opinion,
the district court fairly characterized the physicians' complaint as an
attack on "the very concept of managed care" and declined to usurp
the state's regulatory role through "a novel application of antitrust
laws." 152 The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case to afford
plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint.5 3 Contemporane-
ously, NewYork enacted legislation addressing managed care contracting
practices, including the conditions of physician termination. 5 4 In
response, Aetna changed its standard physician contracts, limiting the
grounds for physician termination. 55
Significantly, the court in Ambroze and Finkelstein continues to view
agency problems as solvable through state regulation. This is probably
wrong. Today's regulatory system, relatively speaking, is designed to
encourage innovation. It offers consumers efficiency gains but poses
greater risks of agency failure. Direct premium regulation has receded
as a policy tool, which adds importance to assuring the competitiveness
of the insurance market, but a competitive insurance market is vulnerable
to adverse price-related effects on quality and access. No new regulatory
box will contain all of these effects. As a result, antitrust courts cannot
be complacent about potential agency failures, as Breyer was in Kartell
or as the district court was in Ambroze and Finkelstein.
This is true notwithstanding the backlash against managed care. The
rhetoric of managed care regulation is always harsher than its substance.
Threats to agency fidelity have been widely recognized and in some cases
lessened, but never removed. For example, preauthorization require-
ments that lead to denial of physician-recommended care as not medi-
cally necessary are now subject to independent review in nearly all
states. 15 6 Insurer use of physician financial incentives must be disclosed
1512 Ambroze, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7274, at *30. The court observed: "The existence of
regulatory supervision over the managed care industry, as well as the recent flurry of
legislative efforts to control HMOs, persuade this Court thatjudicial restraint in this highly
charged area of law and policy is the best recourse." Id. at *30-*31 (citations omitted).
113 Ambroze v. Aetna Health Plans, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1048.
114 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAws § 4406-d(2) (A) ("A health care plan shall not terminate
a contract with a health care professional unless the health care plan provides to the
health care professional a written explanation of the reasons for the proposed contract
termination and an opportunity for a review or hearing.").
155 The cover letter accompanying the changes stated that a physician contract would
not be terminated solely because a provider advocated on behalf of a patient, filed a
complaint against the company or appealed a decision of the company. Finkelstein, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10759, at *7. As an alternative basis for its decision, the district court
determined that the antitrust issues were moot in light of the new statute. Id. at *9-*10.
116 See KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., ASSESSING STATE EXTERNAL REVIEW PROGRAMS AND THE
EFFECTS OF PENDING FEDERAL PATIENTS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION (May 2002) (report to the
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in many instances and may not exceed certain limits in a handful of
states.157 Physicians sometimes enjoy "due process" protection against
arbitrary termination from insurer networks.18 However, efforts to define
a fiduciary obligation running from health insurers through physicians
to subscriber-patients have not borne fruit.15 9
Market trends are more significant, and perhaps more reassuring,
than these regulatory interventions. Tightly controlled managed care
organizations with highly restrictive panels of participating physicians
or burdensome preauthorization requirements did not prove attractive to
consumers. Renewed, rapid growth in health care expenditures, despite
aggressive price discounting and other care management, has triggered
interest among private employers in shifting more of the cost and respon-
sibility to employees.1 60 Rather than the consolidation of health insurance
into a handful of integrated, national, "brand-name" organizations, as
was widely foreseen in the 1990s, the health insurance market is appar-
ently remaining relatively diverse and unconcentrated. 6 1 These changes
may not be ideal from a public policy perspective, but they reduce
the likelihood of insurer monopsony and moderate its anticompetitive
consequences. On the other hand, potential agency failures are burgeon-
ing, and regulation cannot possibly keep up. It therefore is necessary
for antitrust courts to make specific, theoretically informed, evidence-
driven determinations regarding challenged conduct that take account
of regulation but do not automatically defer to it.
Kaiser Family Foundation, available atwww.kff.org/insurance/externalreviewpart2rev.pdf);
RACHEL BEVINS MORGAN, 2003 STATE BY STATE GUIDE TO MANAGED CARE LAW 5-17-5-48
(2003) (compiling state independent review laws).
157 For a discussion of mandatory disclosure as a potential solution to agency failure in
health care, see William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws andAmerican
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1743-71 (1999). See also Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory
Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 1047 (1995) (focusing on
securities regulation).
118 See, e.g., Potvin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153 (Cal. 2000) (holding that
no-cause termination of a physician violated California's right of due process in private
associations affecting public interests).
159 See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (holding that HMO physicians do
not undertake fiduciary duties under ERISA when they make mixed eligibility-treatment
decisions); William M. Sage, UR Here: The Supreme Court's Guide for Managed Care, HEALTH
AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 219, 222-23 (criticizing Pegram as a "missed opportunity"). For
a detailed discussion of a fiduciary model for oversight of agency issues in managed care,
see Peter D. Jacobson, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE MANAGED
CARE ERA 222-49 (2002).
160 See Gabel, Sasso & Rice, supra note 117, at 9.
161 See Cunningham & Sherlock, supra note 15.
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V. CONCLUSION
Monopsony remains a legitimate concern, even if it is not a threat in
every market. In the absence of insurer market power, payer-provider
contracting practices are unlikely to present serious antitrust issues. How-
ever, economic concentration among private health insurers is some-
times high, raising antitrust questions with implications for both the
price and quality of medical treatment.1 62 Antitrust law must, therefore,
have tools capable of assessing its effects. Unfortunately, courts have not
yet met the challenge.
Careful welfare analysis is not a hallmark of Kartell's legacy. By simply
deferring to state regulators, Judge Breyer's opinion dodges an im-
portant question-the welfare implications of a combined monopsonist-
monopolist-that is clearly within the ambit of antitrust law. Breyer does
suggest, however, that the degree of antitrust deference should depend
upon the antitrust theory at issue and the remedy being sought. He
intimates, for example, that antitrust courts might be more receptive to
direct challenges to buyer-side market power than to secondary restraints
such as the prohibition against balance billing. 163
How can courts address the economic effects of increasingly complex
agency relationships in health care? First, agency failure is a form of
market failure and should be judged in that light by antitrust courts.
Second, agency failure is likely to be exacerbated, not ameliorated, by
the agent's market power. Competition therefore is an important safe-
guard for maintaining the integrity of agency relationships. Third, agency
questions often implicate an array of non-antitrust regulatory protec-
tions. Courts should be sensitive to the legal and regulatory framework
in which the challenged conduct arises in conducting their antitrust
analysis. The Kartell decision is insufficiently attentive to many of
these concerns.
Constructing a competition policy that strikes the correct balance
among private markets, antitrust law, and public regulation along dimen-
sions of cost, quality, and access is not easy. Markets are well suited to
162 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE: NUMBER
AND MARKET SHARE OF CARRIERS IN THE SMALL GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET
(Mar. 25, 2002) (GAO-02-536R). Buyer-side market power is also endemic in public health
insurance-Medicare and Medicaid-although there it is subject more to the vagaries of
politics than economics.
163 "Thus, where a monopoly is unlawful, antitrust courts typically seek to change the
market's structure .. ." Kartell VII, 749 F.2d at 928. "[E]ven if the buyer has monopoly
power, an antitrust court (which might, in appropriate circumstances, restructure the market) will




minimize costs, because there are direct financial incentives to do so.
Antitrust efforts to deal with quality are more complicated. Few direct
financial incentives are in place to reward higher quality of care, and
the informational infrastructure does not yet exist to enable quality
competition to occur through consumer choice. The fact that it is diffi-
cult, however, should not excuse antitrust courts from the effort. Cer-
tainly, some conduct is better left to state or federal regulation. For
example, antitrust law is not equipped to micro-manage every agency
issue, such as the overall contracting practices of managed care or the
fiduciary duties governing the physician-patient relationship. More gen-
erally, neither markets nor antitrust law is necessarily capable of promot-
ing access to health insurance.t6 Without effective adjustment of paid
premiums to reflect underlying health risk, for example, competition in
insurance markets can make gaining access to heath care harder, not
easier. 65 In other cases, however, antitrust judges need to be ready to
roll up their sleeves and get to work.
164 See, e.g., Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1285 (discrediting testimony by
managed care companies because they represent only paying patients, not the community
at large)
165 See Joseph P. Newhouse et al., Risk Adjustment and Medicare: Taking a Closer Look,
HEALTH AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 26.
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